It appears that every attorney and law firm operates by utilizing at least two significant models in the practice of law. One is a “legal model,” i.e. the understanding of procedural and substantive law and related fields offered to a client as a legal service.  Another is a “business model,” i.e. internal operating decisions as to location, personnel, income, expense, growth, etc. in connection with the practice of law.

Obviously, these two models must continue to operate effectively if the lawyer, or law firm, wishes to continue a profitable practice of law; however, it is necessary for there to be one further model, to which both of the other models must be subordinate. The controlling model must be the “Ethics Model,” i.e. the state and federal law which govern every attorney’s and law firm’s ethical obligations in the practice of law.

It has been frequently recognized that the ethics model appears to have been superseded by the business model. “Has our profession abandoned principle for profit, professionalism for commercialism?” See Am. Bar Ass’n Commission on Professionalism Report to the House of Delegates, . . . In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 251 (1986). See also the district court, en banc decision, Dondi Props. Corp. v. Comm. Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (“As judges and former practitioners from varied backgrounds and levels of experience, we judicially know that litigation is conducted today in a manner far different from years past.  Whether the increased size of the bar has decreased collegiality, or the legal profession has become only a business, or experienced lawyers have ceased to teach new lawyers the standards to be observed, or because of other factors not readily categorized, we observe patterns of behavior that forebode ill for our system of justice.”)

The Supreme Court of Ohio has observed:

All too often we have observed members of the profession, not only solo practitioners, but also salaried corporate counsel, members of small and large firms, and government attorneys, operating as "hired guns," acting solely at the direction of their employers or clients and neglecting their duty to counsel their clients. Neither the position of an attorney as an employee, nor the pressure to retain a client in a competitive legal environment, can justify an attorney's abdication of the duty of counseling.

One of our ethical considerations, EC-7-8, provides that "[a] lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations. A lawyer ought to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do so. Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal considerations. A lawyer should advise his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative. A lawyer should bring to bear upon this decision-making process the fullness of his experience as well as his objective viewpoint. In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible." As we pointed out in Akron Bar Assn. v. Miller (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 6, 9, 684 N.E.2d 288, 291, " '[T]he lawyer's job is not merely to supply whatever means are needed to achieve the client's goals but also to deliberate with the client and on his behalf about these goals.' " We expect this consideration to be taken seriously by every lawyer in this state.

In these matters respondent acted as a "hired gun"; he failed in his duty to counsel. We do not consider that a mitigating circumstance.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Hardesty, 80 Ohio St.3d 444, 446-47, 687 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1997).

As another court, imposing a sanction on a creditor’s counsel, noted:

While it may well be that creditors often insist that their attorneys file motions for relief from the automatic stay and abandonment as soon as they receive notice of a bankruptcy, “[t]he importunities of a desperate client do not relieve an attorney of the affirmative duty of reasonable inquiry imposed by Rule 9011.” In re Villa Madrid, 110 B.R. 919, 924 (9th Cir. BAP 1990). See also, In re Brooks, 305 B.R. 827, 829 fn. 2 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2004)(“I have heard that mortgagees often grade their lawyers on how quickly they can have a Motion for Relief on file···· This Court assesses the lawyer's performance on whether it comports with Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9011.”).

In re Szymanski, 344 B.R. 891, 894, 898 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006).

In any circumstance where these models compete for prominence, the Ethics Model must always take priority.

See ABA Rule 1.16 –  DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION

(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:

(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law . . . .

It might be noted that various ABA Model Rule provisions and Bankruptcy  Sections share the same conceptual underpinnings. (e.g. ABA Model Rule 1.5, Model Code 2-106, 11 U.S.C. § 330; ABA Model Rule 3.1, Model Code 7-102, Bankruptcy Rule 9011).

The simple point is, in all situations, the Ethics model must be the controlling model.